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A B ST R ACT. War powers hang in a delicate balance, with conflicting statutes overlying
contrasting constitutional prerogatives. Because Congress has filled nearly every shadowy corner
of Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight" with its own imprimatur, war powers debates now hinge
on traditional statutory interpretation, albeit in a unique context. This Note draws upon the
complete set ofjudicial opinions assessing authorizations for the use of military force in order to
propose context-specific canons for interpreting war powers statutes. These canons of war
provide a principled way for courts to ascertain the limits of executive power and civil liberties in
times of military conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
Americans expect their government to do everything in its power under our
laws and Constitution to protect them and their civil liberties. That is exactly
what we are doing. And so far, we have been successful in preventing another
attack on our soil.'
In a May 13, 2006, radio address, President Bush claimed that it is the
President's privilege and duty to exercise the full extent of his powers to protect
the United States from another terrorist attack. A broad array of lawyers,
academics, and retired judges has argued that the Bush Administration has
pushed the envelope of executive war power,2 and the Supreme Court has
checked some of the administration's most expansive assertions of authority.3
Nevertheless, the White House has continued to attract public criticism for
taking broad domestic action,4 even as it claims insulation from the checking
functions of Congress,5 the courts,6 and even internal administrative
oversight.7
1. President George W. Bush, White House Radio Address (May 13, 2oo6), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/2o6o513.html.
2. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing Executive Power, 93 GEo. L.J. 1213 (2005); Richard L.
Abel et al., Lawyers' Statement on Bush Administration's Torture Memos (n.d.), available at
http://www.hrw.org/pub/20o4/lawyers-statement.pdf.
3. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
4. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Bush Warned About Mail-Opening Authority, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2007,
at A3 ; Editorial, More Domestic Spying, WASH. POST, May 12, 2006, at A2o.
5. See, e.g., Thomas Ferraro, Bush, Senate Head for Showdown on Domestic Spying, REUTERS,
June 21, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/
idUSN213 81 37 5 200 7 o621 (describing the administration's resistance to subpoenas issued by
the Senate Judiciary committee concerning the National Security Agency (NSA)
wiretapping program).
6. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, U.S. Appeals Court Upholds Dismissal of Abuse Suit Against C.I.A.,
Saying Secrets Are at Risk, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at A6 (describing a successful assertion
of the state secrets privilege despite "substantial evidence" that an innocent man had been
rendered and tortured); see also Bernard Hibbitts, Judge Dismisses el-Masri CIA Rendition Suit
on State Secrets Grounds, JURIST, May 18, 2006, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2oo6/
os/judge-dismisses-el-masri-cia-rendition.php (noting that the executive invoked the state
secrets privilege only four times between 1953-its judicial inception-and 1976 and more
than twenty times since September 11, 2001).
7. See Scott Shane, With Access Denied, Justice Dept. Drops Spying Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, May
11, 2006, at A34 (describing denial of security clearances necessary for the Department of
Justice's ethics office to investigate the NSA's domestic wiretapping program).
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The debate over the President's power to confront the threat of terrorism
rests between clashing constitutional authorities. Scholars and commentators
have disputed the weight of First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment protections as
balanced against the President's executive powers, and the Justice Department
finishes nearly every brief and legal memorandum concerning national security
with the argument that the government's actions are, in any case, authorized
under the President's power as Commander in Chief.
8
Outside the confines of partisan absolutism, determining the scope of
executive war power is a delicate balancing act. Contrasting constitutional
prerogatives must be evaluated while integrating framework statutes, executive
orders, and quasi-constitutional custom. The Supreme Court's preferred
abacus is the elegant three-part framework described by Justice Jackson in his
concurrence to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.9 When the President
and Congress act in concert, the action harnesses the power of both branches
and is unlikely to violate the principle of separation of powers. When Congress
has failed either to authorize or to deny authority, the action lurks in a "zone of
twilight" of questionable power. When the President and Congress act in
opposition, the President's power is "at its lowest ebb," and the action raises
conspicuous concerns over the separation of powers.'0
Therein lies the rub. Justice Jackson wrote soon after the tremendous
growth of the executive during the New Deal and World War II, but the scope
of legislation expanded dramatically in subsequent decades. Congress waged a
counteroffensive in the campaign over interbranch supremacy by legislating
extensively in the fields of foreign relations and war powers. Particularly in the
post-Watergate era, Congress filled nearly every shadowy corner of the zone of
twilight with its own imprimatur." That is not to say that Congress placed a
relentless series of checks on the executive. Rather, Congress strove to establish
ground rules, providing a limiting framework such as the War Powers
8. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales,
Counsel to the President 31-39 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo2002o8o i.pdf.
9. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
1o. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-
69 (1981) (utilizing Justice Jackson's framework).
11. See generally RIcHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 495 (5th ed. 2003) ("(A]t
present federal law appears to be more primary than interstitial in numerous areas."); ANN
VAN WYNEN THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
116-46 (1982) (describing congressional enactments in the face of "uneasiness over the use
of force abroad by American Presidents").
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Resolution 12 for each effusive authorization like the Patriot Act.' 3 This leaves
Jackson's second category essentially a dead letter. 4 The most sensitive
questions concerning the effective distribution of governmental powers and the
range of permissible executive action are therefore problems of statutory
interpretation. The question becomes more complicated still when successive
Congresses act in apparent opposition. While recent executives have
consistently pushed to expand their authority," shifting patterns of political
allegiance between Congress and the President yield a hodgepodge of
mandates and restraints. 6 Whether an action falls into Jackson's first or third
category requires one to parse the complete legislative scheme.
This question is most pointed in connection with the execution of
authorized war powers. Presidential power in this area is simultaneously
subject to enormously broad delegations and exacting statutory limitations,
torn between clashing constitutional values regarding the proper balance
between branches. On one side lie authorizations for the use of military force
(AUMFs), statutes empowering the President to "introduce United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated."' 7 On the other side lie framework statutes,
enactments defining the mechanisms and boundaries of the execution of those
war powers. Nevertheless, when faced with a conflict between an authorization
for the use of military force and a preexisting framework, the Supreme Court
must determine the net authorization, synthesizing those statutes while
effectuating the underlying constitutional, structural, and historical concerns.
The standard means for resolving statutory ambiguity and conflict is to
invoke the canons of statutory interpretation, long-established rules of
statutory construction. These "'off-the-rack,' gap-filling rules" provide a
12. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2000).
13. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 274 (2001) (to be codified in scattered sections of 8, 12, 18, 21,
22, 28, 31, 47, and 5o U.S.C.).
14. Even in cases where Congress has failed to act, congressional acquiescence to a long-
standing executive practice has been deemed the equivalent of a first category scenario. See
Dames &Moore, 453 U.S. at 686.
15. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103
MICH. L. REV. 676, 717-22 (2005) (describing the Office of Legal Counsel's client-driven
impulse to argue against constraints); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Protecting the Office of
Legal Counsel from Itself, 15 CADOZO L. REV. 513, 522-23 (1993) (describing the consistency of
executive interpretation of the law across Republican and Democratic administrations).
16. See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND
INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-2002 (2d ed. 2005) (describing alternating patterns of lawmaking
when Congress and the President are controlled by the same or different parties).
17. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (2000).
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predictable means to transmute facially unclear statutory text into legal rules
that can be applied to a case at bar. 8 In the realm of war powers, however, the
traditional canons have played out to a stalemate, with multiple canons
pointing toward opposite results. To break this deadlock, I will elaborate new,
context-specific canons, rules of statutory construction that address the unique
concerns of this field, including the exigencies of wartime and the institutional
dynamics that play out as each branch attempts to play a role in managing
armed conflict. 9 Such context-specific canons have been developed extensively
in the field of Indian law,2" but their usefulness in the wider field of statutory
interpretation has not previously been recognized. This Note builds the
"canons of war" on a foundation of past judicial challenges to the powers
granted by AUMFs and supplements them with original arguments balancing a
dynamic vision of congressional intent with the government's shared desire for
victory.
Part I demonstrates the inadequacy of the traditional canons by laying out a
concrete and unresolved clash over AUMF interpretation: the debate over the
legality of the National Security Agency's (NSA) warrantless wiretap program.
Part II explains how context-specific canons can integrate constitutional,
structural, and historical concerns to resolve this deadlock and ensure
predictable and constitutionally appropriate interpretation. This Part then lays
out the set of past judicial decisions challenging authority under an AUMF,
assessing trends and means of analysis. Part III builds on these decisions,
synthesizing them along with the institutional dynamics that underpin war
18. William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law
as Equilibrium, io8 HAKv. L. REV. 26, 67 (1994).
19. This deadlock is not unique to war powers statutes, and context-specific canons might be
applied to numerous other fields where statutory mandates clash over a foundation of
constitutional imperatives. Nevertheless, war powers serve as an apt example because of
both the richness of recent debates and the gravity of constitutional concerns.
2o. See, e.g., County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 258 (1992) (noting the presumption that states cannot tax Indian land); Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 173 (1989) (noting the presumption that
states can tax activities within their borders, including Indian tribal activities); see also Duro
v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (199o) (noting presumption against criminal jurisdiction by an
Indian tribe over a nonmember); Ala. Pac. Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)
(expressing the general rule that statutes "passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes
or communities are to be liberally construed, doubtful expression being resolved in favor of
the Indians"). Professors James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear have also shown that the
statutory context of labor law affects the frequency with which specific judges invoke
ostensibly neutral canons as well, but they attributed the resolution of these cases to
ideology rather than underlying constitutional or structural concerns. James J. Brudney &
Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L.
REv. 1 (2005).
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powers legislation, and develops a set of canons to guide the executive and
judiciary and to allow legislative anticipation of an AUMF's effect. This Part
also applies the canons to the wiretapping controversy to demonstrate their
real-world efficacy. Finally, Part IV applies the canons to a series of graduated
examples to demonstrate their value within and beyond the dispute over NSA
wiretapping.
I. WARRANTS, WIRETAPS, AND WAR POWERS: A TRADITIONAL
STATUTORY ANALYSIS
On December 16, 2005, a front-page article in the New York Times began:
"Months after the Sept. ii attacks, President Bush secretly authorized the
National Security Agency to eavesdrop on Americans and others inside the
United States to search for evidence of terrorist activity without the court-
approved warrants ordinarily required for domestic spying .... ,,2 The story
detailed a system under which the NSA monitored the phone calls of "up to
500 people in the United States at any given time" without warrants from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)22 established under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)"3
The story also laid out the skeleton of the Bush Administration's legal
argument that the President possessed the authority to carry out the program.
According to Bush Administration lawyers, "the Congressional resolution on
the campaign against terrorism provided ample authorization" for a broad
monitoring system. 4 Moreover, the article referenced the government's
supplemental brief in In re Sealed Case, the only case to ever reach the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR), in which the Department
of Justice asserted that "the Constitution vests in the President inherent
authority to conduct warrantless intelligence surveillance (electronic or
21. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
16, 2005, at Ai.
22. Id.
23. 50 U.S.C. §§ 18o1-1862 (2000). Under FISA, foreign intelligence surveillance ordinarily is
conducted pursuant to a warrant application prepared by the Department of Justice,
personally approved by the Attorney General, and signed by a judge of the FISC upon a
determination that there is probable cause that the target of the surveillance is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804-1805 (2000).
24. Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 21.
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otherwise) of foreign powers or their agents, and Congress cannot by statute
extinguish that constitutional authority."
25
The NSA program, sitting at the intersection of the September 11 AUMF
and FISA, provides an ideal setting to analyze conflicts between authorizing
and restricting war powers statutes. Arguments based on traditional statutory
interpretation proliferate on both sides, but in this unique context each
statutory presumption rests on deeper constitutional commitments. The
AUMF/FISA case study fleshes out the array of canons that arise in the
interpretation of war powers statutes and demonstrates the need for context-
based interpretation to resolve the inevitable and intractable clash of traditional
canons.
A. Statutory Arguments in Favor of the NSA Surveillance Program
The government issued its first legal response on December 22, only six
days after the initial disclosure, in a letter from the Department of Justice
(DOJ) to the chairmen and ranking members of the House and Senate Select
Committees on Intelligence. 6 After stressing previous briefings to "Leaders of
the Congress" and the necessity of the program, the DOJ letter leads with the
Article II argument that the President possesses inherent authority to wiretap.
Despite the simple appeal of that argument, the bulk of the letter is dedicated
to the argument that Congress authorized the program as part of the post-
September 11 AUMF, relying on numerous canon-based arguments to support
its statutory construction. The validity of this argument turns on how to
interpret the scope of the post-September 11 AUMF. The text of the
authorization reads in relevant part:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2OOl, or harbored such organizations or
25. Supplemental Brief for the United States, In re Sealed Case, 31o F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev.
2002) (No. 02-001), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/o925o2sup.html.
This backstop argument could only color the interpretation of FISA and urge avoidance; if it
were accepted, the FISA Court of Review-a product of Congress's attempt to regulate
intelligence surveillance-would lack the authority to make the ruling at all.
26. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Pat Roberts
et al., Chairmen and Ranking Members, H. and S. Select Comms. on Intelligence (Dec. 22,
2005), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/pdf/
12%2022%20050/o2oNSA%2oletter.pdf (hereinafter DOJ Letter].
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persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.27
The DOJ letter argues that the more recently enacted AUMF now governs
the statutory field of wiretapping previously occupied by FISA. This assertion
relies on the traditional argument that the latest expression of the sovereign
will governs between enactments of equivalent weight: lex posterior derogat legi
priori.2 Relying on a purely textualist argument, the letter asserts that "all
necessary and appropriate force" surely includes wiretapping, without any
congressional restriction on its execution. 9
The DOJ letter next argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld buttresses this interpretation. Hamdi ruled that the AUMF authorized
a "fundamental incident of waging war,"3 but did not address the question of
whether domestic wiretapping is an essential aspect of war making. However,
the letter indirectly asserts that Congress is presumed to legislate with
knowledge of the historical circumstances of similar actions taken under past
declarations of war and AUMFs. This is an application of the in pari materia
rule, whereby similar language enacted with a similar legislative purpose is
interpreted to have a comparable meaning, even across statutes.3' While not
taken in haec verba - in identical words - from any past AUMF,3" the language
27. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. 1 2001)).
28. See, e.g., Patterson v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 742 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1984); Mark Tushnet,
Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 1Ol MICH. L. REv. 2781, 2791 (2003); cf Edye v.
Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580 (1884) (declaring that a congressional statute
must prevail over an earlier ratified treaty).
29. DOJ Letter, supra note 26, at 2-3. For further discussion and historical background to this
argument, see U.S. Dep't of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting the Activities of the
National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 20o6),
http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/dojol9o6.pdf [hereinafter DOJ Whitepaper]. For a fuller
discussion of this whitepaper, see infra text accompanying note 38.
30. 542 U.S. 507, 518-19 (2004).
31. See, e.g., Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
32. Cf. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub L. No. 102-1, 105
Stat. 3 (1991) ( "The President is authorized... to use United States Armed Forces pursuant
to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (199o) in order to achieve
implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669,
670, 674, and 677.").
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of the post-September 11 AUMF is, if anything, broader than past
authorizations.33
Even if the AUMF did not rid the legislative field of FISA, the DOJ letter
argues that the breadth of the implied authorization activates a specific override
provision. FISA states that "[a] person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally
engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by
statute."' According to the DOJ, the post-September 11 AUMF is a statute that,
if understood to permit wiretaps, conforms with FISA's structure without
requiring repeal.
3s
Finally, the DOJ letter stakes out the position that the complete statutory
scheme-FISA and the AUMF-must be construed not to conflict with the
President's inherent authority to wiretap under the Commander-in-Chief
Clause. 6 This argument utilizes the constitutional avoidance canon, which
requires that "when an Act of Congress raises 'a serious doubt' as to its
constitutionality, '[a] [c]ourt will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.' 37 This
argument, of course, circles back to the initial claim that the President
possesses some inherent authority to wiretap.
The DOJ letter was followed on January 19, 2006, by a formal whitepaper
that presents a few additional arguments that merit discussion, along with a
fuller explanation of the previous arguments. 3 First, the whitepaper contends
33. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 252 (2002)
("[The AUMF] is an extraordinarily broad delegation -arguably the broadest congressional
delegation of war power in our nation's history.").
34. 50 U.S.C. 5 18o9(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
35. DOJ Letter, supra note 26, at 3-4; see also DOJ Whitepaper, supra note 29, at 1394-1402
(elaborating on this argument); cf Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003) (striving to avoid
an implicit repeal of any part of multiple federal savings provisions for the establishment of
congressional districts); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (describing the canon
against implied repeals).
36. DOJ Letter, supra note 26, at 4; see also DOJ Whitepaper, supra note 29, at 1402-10
(elaborating on this argument and particularly distinguishing Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 170 (1804), and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
37. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932)).
38. DOJ Whitepaper, supra note 29. The whitepaper remains the most complete enunciation of
the administration's legal justification for the program. See The Terrorist Surveillance
Program and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, ioth Cong. 3
(2007) (statement of Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, Department of Justice), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2oo7_hr/o6o7o7bradbury.pdf.
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that principles of statutory construction dictate that "congressional enactments
are to be broadly construed where they indicate support for authority long
asserted and exercised by the Executive Branch." 9 Such logic would expand
further on Dames & Moore v. Regan's placement of congressional acquiescence
in the first Youngstown category4" and would require the hefty assumption that
Congress legislates with knowledge of the statutory landscape and integrates
past interpretations when it reauthorizes a statute.4 ' Finally, the whitepaper
suggests that when Congress delegates authority to the President, the
delegation ought to be read as broadly as possible in order to maximize
executive flexibility.42 Given the broad authority and flexibility presumed to be
held by a military commander, this deference argument can be viewed as an
elaboration on constitutional avoidance of the Commander in Chief authority.
B. Statutory Arguments Against the NSA Surveillance Program
Opponents of the program launched their first legal salvo in an open letter
to congressional leaders and the chief judge of the FISC on January 9, 20o6."
Signed by fourteen scholars of constitutional law and former government
officials, including conservatives such as Curtis Bradley and Richard Epstein,
the experts' letter lays out a formal refutation of the DOJ's December 22 letter.
After the release of the January 19 whitepaper, a response came from an even
more surprising source: David S. Kris, a former associate deputy attorney
general who oversaw national security issues- including FISA-from 2000 to
2003, released a refutation of the Justice Department's detailed position.44 The
39. DOJ Whitepaper, supra note 29, at 1384 (citing Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-303 (1981);
United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543-45 (1950)).
40. See supra note 14.
41. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988) (expressing skepticism toward
such arguments).
42. DOJ Whitepaper, supra note 29, at 1386 ("[E]ven in normal times ... 'Congress cannot
anticipate and legislate with regard to every possible action the President may find it
necessary to take."' (quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981))).
43. Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, Professor, Duke Univ., et al., to Bill Frist, Majority Leader,
U.S. Senate, et al. (Jan. 9. 20o6), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/
20o6ologlegalexpertsanalysis.pdf [hereinafter Experts' Letter].
44. Memorandum from David Kris (Jan. 25, 20o6), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/NSAProgramQuestions.pdf
[hereinafter Kris Memorandum]; see also Dan Eggen & Walter Pincus, Ex-Justice Lawyer
Rips Case for Spying, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2006, at A3. Kris was later called before Congress
to testify, and he submitted a modified memorandum for the record. See NSA III: Wartime
Executive Powers and the FISA Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, io 9 th
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Kris memorandum primarily elaborates a forceful textual analysis, looking to
the exact terms of FISA as they have been applied by the Justice Department
since the Act's passage. Those arguments are less relevant here, as they address
the intricacies of FISA rather than its interaction with the AUMF.
The experts' letter dedicates half of its text to refuting the applicability of
the canons cited by the Justice Department and half to advancing new statutory
arguments. The first and most important argument demands that the specific
words of a framework statute must govern over the general authorization
found in an AUMF, regardless of the relative date of passage. 4' This comports
with the general canon that the specific governs the general or, in other words,
that "[s]pecific provisions targeting a particular issue apply instead of
provisions more generally covering the issue. " 46 In this case, the canon
suggests that FISA's series of specific pronouncements -in particular the
provision governing which laws may authorize wiretaps 47 -remain in force
over the AUMF's exceedingly vague authorization. Moreover, the experts claim
that the proviso allowing electronic surveillance without a warrant for fifteen
days following a declaration of war48 governs any subsequent AUMF, since the
provision anticipates precisely such authorizations. Thus this canon runs
counter to the canon favoring the most recent enactment, the lex posterior canon
described above.
Second, the experts' letter stresses that interpreting an AUMF to overcome
framework statutes designed to cabin executive power would implicitly repeal
the prior congressional enactment, sub silentio.49 The Supreme Court has had a
long-standing policy strongly disfavoring such repeals by implication,5" and in
recent cases has required absolute irreconcilability."1 Thus, the scholars would
discount the relevance of historical powers accompanying an AUMF when
Congress has moved specifically and comprehensively to regulate the field; the
canon against implied repeals clashes directly with in pari materia
Cong. (2006) (statement of David S. Kris, Senior Vice President, Time Warner, Inc.),
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id= 182 5&witid=944 .
45. Experts' Letter, supra note 43, at 3.
46. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 324 (1994) (citing Green
v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524-25 (1989); Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T.
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987)).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 2 5 11(2)( 0 (2000).
48. 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
49. Experts' Letter, supra note 43, at 4.
so. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549-51 (1974).
51. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 381 (1996); see also Kris Memorandum,
supra note 44, at 4 (describing the clear statement rule governing implied repeals).
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interpretation of successive AUMFs whose dates of passage bracket the passage
of a specific regulation. 2
Finally, the experts argue that the canon in favor of constitutional
avoidance cuts against, rather than in favor of, the program's legality. The
experts assert that, rather than infringing on the President's power as
Commander in Chief, the NSA wiretap program comes too close to violating
the Fourth Amendment. 3 Therefore the statutes at play should be interpreted
to avoid the difficult constitutional question, holding that Congress at no time
authorized the surveillance. Constitutional avoidance concerning individual
rights is a complex tool for the interpretation of AUMFs. Different framework
statutes protect different constitutional interests, 4 and the power of the canon
will vary depending on whether it is used to prevent a true constitutional
collision or simply to avoid answering a constitutional question.
The Kris memorandum presents one last canon-based argument. In
refuting the government's argument that the "other statute" escape clause in
FISA's criminal penalties provision allows electronic surveillance to be
authorized by any subsequent statute, Kris describes in all but name the canon
that provisos-qualifications, conditions, and loopholes-should be
interpreted narrowly."5 Such escape clauses will be particularly important in
interpreting AUMFs, as arguments for authority will often utilize them as
hooks to secure exceptions." In contrast to the government's aim to read
AUMFs reasonably to anticipate provisos, Kris would narrow both the scope of
the proviso and the range of statutes that might trigger it.
As this controversy demonstrates, traditional canons fail to resolve the clash
over the NSA's authority to execute the warrantless wiretap program. Congress
52. See Experts' Letter, supra note 43, at 4.
53. Id. at 8-9.
s4. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 690 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (finding a taking under the Fifth Amendment, despite rejecting
petitioners' argument that presidential action violated both the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701-17o6 (Supp. III 1976), and the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §5 1330, 16o2-1611 (1976)); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("National security cases, moreover, often reflect a
convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values....").
ss. Kris Memorandum, supra note 44, at 4; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 46, at 324 (citing
Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739 (1989)) (describing the canon).
56. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 540 (2004) (describing an exception to the Non-
Detention Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000), which allows imprisonment of a citizen
'pursuant to an Act of Congress").
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has been unable to enact a permanent legislative fix, 7 leaving the controversy
unresolved after nearly two years of public scrutiny. s8 Thus there is a
demonstrable need for a new tool to determine the proper interpretation of the
governing statutory regime. The context-specific canons of statutory
interpretation elaborated below will allow those interpreting war powers
legislation to resolve statutory conflicts and will provide a clearer
understanding of the powers granted or withheld by future legislation.
II. FRAMEWORKS AND AUTHORIZATIONS:
A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS
The struggle over warrantless wiretaps is merely a recent example in a
history of conflicts between the statutory limitations and authorizations
governing war powers. Whether the purported limitation on the President's
power derives from a framework statute or from a condition of the AUMF
itself, statutory conflicts concerning the scope of war powers date back to the
earliest days of the Republic. 9 This Part analyzes these decisions in numerical
terms before Part III looks at the logic underlying the decisions. The resulting
combination of jurisprudential and institutional analysis will provide the
foundation for context-specific canons for the interpretation of AUMFs and
other war powers legislation. By synthesizing this case law, the canons of war
will allow members of Congress and the executive properly to anticipate the
meaning of a complete statutory framework, promoting both informed
legislation and executive adherence to the rule of law.
S7. See Protect America Act, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552, 557 (2007) (temporarily
authorizing warrantless wiretapping for a six-month period pending further legislative
deliberation).
58. See, e.g., Oversight Hearing on the Constitutional Limitations on Domestic Surveillance: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 11oth Cong. 4-5 (2007) (statement of Jameel Jaffer, Director, National Security
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/
20o7_hr/o6o7o7jaffer.pdf. But see Bradbury, supra note 38, at 3, 7 (asserting that a FISC
judge's approval of a variation of the program has resolved the controversy). While one
recent hearing on the controversy was entitled "Constitutional Limitations on Domestic
Surveillance," those testifying inevitably launched into statutory arguments. See, e.g.,
Constitutional Limitations on Domestic Surveillance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 1ioth Cong. 4-5
(2007) (statement of Louis Fisher), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2oo7_hr/o6o7o7fisher.pdf.
5g. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
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A. Why Context-Specific Canons?
In the war powers context, traditional canons gird unique underlying
principles -constitutional, structural, and historical." ° When those principles
are in tension, context-specific canons are necessary to resolve the resulting
conflicts. While courts have long encountered the difficulty that canons of
construction frequently counter one another when interpreting ordinary
statutes,6' here the stakes are higher and the values are consistently deeper. For
example, while the in pari materia canon normally would merely aid a court in
interpreting a statute by looking to the similar enactments by an earlier
Congress or another state,62 in the war powers context, parallel interpretation
raises the full history of presidential war making. Moreover, the Supreme
Court has employed canons and presumptions as a "way to enforce
'underenforced' constitutional norms, '' 6, such as federalism and nondelegation,
on the broader universe of statutes.6 4 When force is authorized, the
Commander-in-Chief Clause power, Congress's enumerated authority
concerning war, and individuals' core civil liberties all hang in the balance, and
no simple instruction to avoid constitutional questions will untie the statutory
knot.
A potential solution is to apply context-specific canons of statutory
interpretation, canons that apply only in a particular field and trump or resolve
the standard canons. The most prominent examples of these context-specific
60. Each default rule will emphasize a power, institution, or traditional role. For example, the
canon that provisos must be interpreted narrowly effectively restrains the President's
customary flexibility. See, e.g., GEORGE SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD
AFFAIRS 76 (1919) (describing Congress's duty to delegate "every power which will aid in the
successful prosecution of the war"). At the same time, it underscores Congress's powers to
make rules concerning capture and the regulation of the armed forces. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cls. 11, 14. While canons have similar effects in other areas of statutory interpretation,
in the war powers arena the powers are more explicitly laid out in the Constitution and the
stakes are undoubtedly higher.
61. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (195o).
62. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978); Zerbe v. State, 578 P.2d 597 (Ala. 1978).
63. ESKRIDGE, supra note 46, at 286. See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212 (1978).
64. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (state sovereign immunity); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989) (nondelegation). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE,
JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRET-r, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION
OF PUBIuc POLICY 850-51 (3d ed. 2001) (listing numerous substantive canons). Whether a
particular norm is underenforced is, of course, a distinct question.
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canons exist in the field of American Indian law."s Standard canons of statutory
interpretation have been modified to reflect "the unique trust relationship
between the United States and the Indians ''66 and "a backdrop positing the
tribes as political entities distinct from the United States." 6' As a result, the
Supreme Court has plainly stated that "the standard principles of statutory
construction do not have their usual force in cases involving Indian law.
6 8
The Court recently brought the resultant context-specific canons into focus
in Chickasaw Nation v. United States, in which the Court determined that a
gaming tax exemption for states did not apply to Indian tribes. 69 The canon
against surplusage- "that 'every clause and word of a statute' should, 'if
possible,' be given 'effect"' 7° - and the broad canon of construction in favor of
native tribes-"that 'statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the
Indians with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit"'71 favored the
tribes. The canon requiring a clear statement to establish a tax exemption72 and
the hoary (and rarely evoked) canon that a court may "reject words 'as
surplusage' if 'inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the
statute' '73 favored the government. The Court developed a unique standard
integrating these presumptions: the tribe's preferred construction must be a
"fairly capable" reading of the statutory text to allow the canon favoring
American Indians to trump the canon against implied exemptions to federal
taxation.7 4 The Court cautioned that the nuances underpinning these canons
cannot allow for a simple trump; rather these contextual canons balance a
principle-laden field."'
While the trusteeship relationship with American Indians underpins the
canons of American Indian law, the principles that clash beneath war powers
65. See supra note 20.
66. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,247 (1985).
67. Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and the Federal Courts: Applying the Myths and the Methods of
Marbury v. Madison to Tribal Courts' Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 77, 101 (2004).
68. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985).
69. 534 U.S. 84, 93-95 (2oo1).
70. Id. at 93 (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
71. Id. at 93-94 (quoting Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 766).
72. Id. at 95 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 354 (1988)).
73. Id. at 94 (quoting KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
525 (196o)).
74. Id. (citing Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. at 766).
75. See id. at 95 ("This Court's earlier cases are too individualized, involving too many different
kinds of legal circumstances, to warrant any such assessment about the two canons' relative
strength.").
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statutes provide an even stronger basis for context-specific canons. The
President's constitutional powers are vague-which may make them all the
more powerful - resting on the Commander-in-Chief Clause and the Executive
Vesting Clause. 6 The Constitution does not leave Congress without a voice in
governing armed conflict, however; five clauses of Article I, Section 8
enumerate legislative authority over war powers. 77 The structural conflict is
also clear, with the President's first-mover advantage and central leadership in
times of crisis threatening to overpower Congress's long-term commitment to
the rule of law.78 Finally, the historical association of particular powers with
each branch, typified by extreme incidents such as President Truman's
unilateral use of atomic weapons against Japan and Congress's termination of
appropriations for the Vietnam War, support presumptions of appropriate
realms in which one branch may trump the other.
Much of the normative groundwork for the development of specific canons
has been laid by decades of executive power scholarship.79 Yet no scholar has
thoroughly analyzed judicial opinions challenging the President's authority to
act purely based on an AUMF. By linking these cases with prior studies of
structure and constitutional principle, this Note distills and refines canons that
will allow presidents to understand the extent of the power delegated to them,
Congresses to know what power they are delegating, and judges to interpret
complicated questions of wartime authority in a manner that is both principled
and predictable.S"
76. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. I; id. § 2, cl. 1.
77. Id. art. I, § 8, cis. 11-14, 16.
78. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of
the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255,1274 (1988).
79. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM
AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993); Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IR.AN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); SUTHERLAND,
supra note 60; JOHN Yoo, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11 (2005).
go. See generally John F. Manning, Legal Realism and the Canons' Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283,
290-95 (2002) (describing the canons' usefulness). While some recent legal scholarship has
argued that predictability is a detriment, as ambiguity may force warring parties- here rival
branches of government -to negotiate a compromise in order to avoid uncertainty, see, e.g.,
Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1641,
1675-85 (2003), the application of war powers provides too many opportunities for the
executive to act unilaterally and in secret, avoiding beneficial conciliation. See, e.g., Scott
Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at Ai.
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B. The War Powers Cases
This review of past decisions uses the complete set of federal cases that
challenge the executive's authority to act based solely on an AUMF. In sum,
there have been twenty-one cases interpreting nine AUMFs or declarations of
war." This collection of precedents results from electronic database searches
81. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
243, 116 Stat. 1498 (to be codified at 5o U.S.C. § 1541 note); To Authorize the Use of U.S.
Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the
United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (to be codified at so U.S.C. § 1541
note); To Authorize the Use of U.S. Armed Forces Pursuant to U.N. Security Council
Resolution 678 with respect to Iraq, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Star. 3 (1991) (codified at 5o
U.S.C. § 1541 note); Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97
Star. 805 (1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note); Joint Resolution To Promote the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security in Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution), Pub. L. No. 88-4o8, 78 Stat. 384 (1964); Joint Resolution To Promote Peace
and Stability in the Middle East, Pub. L. No. 85-7, 71 Star. 5 (1957) (authorizing use of force
to stabilize Egypt after the Suez Crisis); Joint Resolution Authorizing the President To
Employ the Armed Forces of the United States for Protecting the Security of Formosa, the
Pescadores, and Related Positions and Territories of That Area, Pub. L. No. 84-4, 69 Stat. 7
(1955); Joint Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Government of
Rumania and the Government and the People of the United States and Making Provisions
To Prosecute the Same, Pub. L. No. 77-565, 56 Stat. 307 (1942); Joint Resolution Declaring
that a State of War Exists Between the Government of Hungary and the Government and
the People of the United States and Making Provisions To Prosecute the Same, Pub. L. No.
77-564, 56 Star. 307 (1942); Joint Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists Between
the Government of Bulgaria and the Government and the People of the United States and
Making Provisions To Prosecute the Same, Pub. L. No. 77-563, 56 Stat. 307 (1942); Joint
Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Government of Italy and the
Government and the People of the United States and Making Provision To Prosecute the
Same, Pub. L. No. 332, 55 Stat. 797 (1941); Joint Resolution Declaring that a State of War
Exists Between the Government of Germany and the Government and the People of the
United States and Making Provision To Prosecute the Same, Pub. L. No. 331, 55 Star. 796
(1941); Joint Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Imperial
Government of Japan and the Government and the People of the United States and Making
Provisions To Prosecute the Same, Pub. L. No. 328, SS Stat. 795 (1941); Joint Resolution
Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian
Government and the Government and the People of the United States and Making
Provision To Prosecute the Same, Pub. L. No. 17, 40 Stat. 429 (1917); Joint Resolution
Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Imperial German Government and the
Government and the People of the United States and Making Provision To Prosecute the
Same, Pub. L. No. 1, 40 Stat. 1 (1917); An Act Declaring that War Exists Between the United
States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364 (1898); An Act Providing
for the Prosecution of the Existing War Between the United States and the Republic of
Mexico, ch. XVI, 9 Stat. 9 (1846); An Act for the Protection of the Commerce of the United
States Against the Algerine Cruisers, ch. XC, 3 Stat. 230 (1815); An Act Declaring War
Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Dependencies thereof,
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for all cases that have applied any of the eleven declarations of war and the
eleven broad AUMFs ever issued by the U.S. Congress.
82
What is not included? First, the search did not include cases interpreting
every congressional enactment that might arguably authorize force. Several acts
listed in Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith's study of the President's powers
after September 1183 might only questionably be considered AUMFs; the
authorized action could be carried out merely through customs or law
enforcement.84 Moreover, no cases in the collection concern the American Civil
War or the Korean War. As famously noted in The Prize Cases, the Civil War
was initiated under the President's power as Commander in Chief to respond
to armed attack, and therefore neither utilized nor required congressional
authorization. 8s The Korean War received no general authorization from
Congress, which instead merely enacted the Defense Production Act of 195086
to mobilize industrial production in support of the United Nations-sponsored
police action.8 7 While these cases surely represent important executive power
precedents, they are simply not relevant to the special legal challenges posed by
exercises of executive power pursuant to congressional legislation. Finally, the
search did not include cases relying on appropriations for military operations.
Presidents have strenuously argued that appropriations signal congressional
and the United States of America and Their Territories, ch. CII, 2 Star. 755 (1812); An Act for
the Protection of the Commerce and Seamen of the United States, Against the Tripolitan
Cruisers, ch. IV, 2 Stat. 129 (1802); An Act Further To Protect the Commerce of the United
States, ch. LXVIII, 1 Stat. 578 (1798) (authorizing use of offensive force in the Quasi War
with France); An Act More Effectually To Protect the Commerce and Coasts of the United
States, ch. XLVIII, 1 Stat. 561 (1798) (authorizing use of defensive force in the Quasi War
with France).
82. Cases were located by searching databases of federal cases in both LexisNexis and Westlaw
for both the AUMF's citation in Statutes at Large and either the Public Law Number (when
available) or the informal name of the enactment.
83. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,
118 HARv. L. REV. 2047, 2073-74 nn.112-16 (2005).
84. See, e.g., An Act To Provide for the Protection of the Salmon Fisheries of Alaska, ch. 415, § 3,
25 Star. loo9, lOO (1889) ("[H]e shall also cause one or more vessels of the United States to
diligently cruise said waters and arrest all persons, and seize all vessels found to be, or to
have been, engaged in any violation of the laws of the United States therein.").
85. The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862); see also An Act
To Provide for the Payment of the Militia and Volunteers Called into the Service of the
United States from the Time They Were Called into Service to the Thirtieth Day of June,
Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-One, ch. 2, 12 Star. 255 (1861) (appropriating funds
retroactively to pay for volunteer units soon after the initiation of hostilities).
86. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2171 (2000).
87. See DAVID M. ACKERMAN & RIcHARD F. GRIMMETr, DECLARATIONS OF WAR 38 (Ernest V.
Klun ed., 2002).
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authorization of, or at least acquiescence to, military action,8 and Chief Justice
John Roberts has stated, in his prior role as a judge of the D.C. Circuit, that
they may implicitly repeal framework statutes.8 9 Nevertheless, the War Powers
Resolution explicitly directs that authorization should not be inferred from
appropriations,9" so they are not included.
Second, the set of cases does not include every decision that cites an AUMF
or declaration of war. Many cases reference an AUMF merely to provide factual
background to a controversy" ' or to note the foundation of a more specific
congressional enactment.92 I included only cases that address the executive's
authority to act pursuant to an AUMF alone, as would be dictated by the
Youngstown framework. In addition, the set includes only the highest appeal of
a particular case, both to exclude overturned cases and to avoid stacking
affirmed cases. 93
While the recent wave of public litigation over presidential power might
lead one to expect a large number of decisions, the search returned only twenty
cases. Ten of the cases relate to conflicts from the Quasi War with France to the
88. See, e.g., Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Att'y Gen., to Janet Reno, Att'y
Gen. (Dec. 19, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/final.htm (describing
continued authorization for military operations in Kosovo under a supplemental
appropriations bill).
8g. See, e.g., Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 37o F.3d 41, 6o (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring)
(finding that the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 1o8-
11, 117 Stat. 559, 579 (2003), implicitly repealed the provision in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 16o5(a)(7) (2ooo), maintaining liability for prior acts
undertaken while a state sponsor of terrorism, even if the state is subsequently restored to
good status).
90. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1) (2000).
91. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004); Anderson v. United States, 273 F. 20, 22
(8th Cir. 1921).
92. See, e.g., Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U.S. 253 (1929). The Japanese
internment cases that specifically rely on a declaration of war, however, are included.
Although courts deemed the executive order establishing the internment to have been
"ratified" by a subsequent statute that criminalized violation of the executive order, the
criminal statute recognized, rather than granted, the authority to carry out the internments.
See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 89-
90 (1943).
93. The set does not include American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency, 438 F.
Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 20o6), rev'd 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007), which challenged the
NSA warrantless wiretapping program. Although the district court ruled directly on the
question of whether the President had the authority to pursue the program under the post-
September ii AUMF, id. at 779-8o, the circuit court vacated the district court's decision on
the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec.
Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007). Since the highest appeal of the case did not
address the issue on the merits, it is excluded from the set of cases.
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Spanish-American War, and ten relate to clashes from World War I to the
current war on terror. Most of the early cases involve seizure of naval vessels
and the executive's authority to establish or collect duties on goods imported or
exported from an occupied territory. World War I saw a great collaboration
between the legislative and executive branches, possibly due to the restricted
view of delegation prevalent at the time.94 As a result, few cases challenging the
President relied exclusively on the declaration of war.9 Where cases from the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries do arise, they involve criminal sanctions
on the home front and the standards for detention of enemy combatants,
reflecting both the decline of admiralty and the increasing role of public-
interest impact litigation. 96 Only two cases substantively ruled on the extent of
permissible military action, loosely defined to include intelligence-gathering; 97
the courts avoided most other challenges via the political question doctrine or
other judicial escape hatches. 98 Nevertheless, there has been a dramatic spike in
frequency of cases under the current AUMF, as Congress has largely refrained
from either providing specific authorizations or permanently loosening the
restrictive enactments of the post-Vietnam era, with the Military Commissions
Act being a notable exception.99 Simultaneously, the President has relied solely
on the post-September 11 AUMF and his constitutional powers as Commander
in Chief to pursue a global -and unconventional war.' °0 Of course, the growth
94. As one court noted, "This situation, in the judgment of Congress, required much
legislation." United States v. Hicks, 256 F. 707, 709 (W.D. Ky. i919).
95. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135, 142 (1919) (describing a
supplemental grant of authority to seize control of all systems of transportation inside the
United States for such purposes "connected with the emergency as may be needful or
desirable").
96. See generally ANTHONY D. ROMERO & DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, IN DEFENSE OF OUR AMERICA:
THE FIGHT FOR CML LIBERTIES IN THE AGE OF TERROR (2007) (describing the breadth of
modern impact litigation).
97. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cit. 1971); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192
(C.C.D.N.Y. 18o6) (No. 16,342).
98. See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Union, 493 F.3d at 648; Doe v. Bush, 323 F.3d 133 (ist Cit.
2003); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250
(E.D.N.Y. 2006).
99. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of lo U.S.C.); see also
Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11o-55, §S 2, 6(c), 121 Stat. 552, 552-57 (to be
codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 18o3, 1805) (providing authorization for warrantless wiretaps while
simultaneously limiting the authorization to six months).
100. This has been the result of both a Congress divided over the extent of powers it is willing to
grant in the quasi-military context of the war on terror and an administration willing to test
the outer limits of the President's inherent authority under the Commander-in-Chief
Clause. See Wartime Executive Power and the National Security Agency's Surveillance Authority:
117:28o, 2007
THE CANONS OF WAR
of civil liberties organizations specializing in impact litigation 1 ' and the
pressure on law firms to participate in pro bono work0 2 undoubtedly have
contributed to the recent challenges. °3
One clear pattern emerges from this basic assessment: as the number of
cases brought to challenge action pursuant to a given AUMF increases, the
likelihood of presidential victory decreases substantially. Of the seven cases
that the executive won, six were the first case to be litigated under a particular
AUMF. Moreover, in the one case remaining, Padilla v. Hanft,' °4 the executive
avoided Supreme Court review of a victory in the Fourth Circuit by filing
criminal charges against Jose Padilla, effectively mooting the case.'05
This "one free pass" jurisprudence is noteworthy in itself, and its
consistency is dangerous in both directions."6 In early cases, the judiciary
shows a distressing willingness to follow the Commander in Chief s marching
orders, disregarding the constitutional distribution of war powers. As more
time passes since the emergency that precipitated the use of force, however,
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, io9th Cong. 9 (2006) (statement of Sen.
Patrick J. Leahy) ("You, Mr. Attorney General, said the administration did not ask for
legislation authorizing warrantless wiretapping of Americans, and did not think such
legislation would pass."); see also U.S. Senate Judiciay Committee Holds a Hearing on Wartime
Executive Power and the NSA's Surveillance Authority, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Feb. 6, 2006,
http ://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/20o6/o2/o6/AR2oo6o2o6oo93
.html (providing transcript of the hearing).
lo. See, e.g., Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, September ith, http://www.ccr-
ny.org/v2/legal/septemberlith/septemberiith.asp (last visited Oct. 14, 2007) (describing
twenty-four cases brought against the administration or its allies concerning executive
power after September ii).
102. See generally THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (Robert A. Katzmann ed., 1995)
(describing the emergence and structure of pro bono work by large, traditional law firms).
103 Overall, the executive won two cases and lost eight cases in the nineteenth century. In the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the executive has won five cases and lost four. Thus, in
total, the executive has won seven cases and lost thirteen.
104. 423 F.3d 386 (4 th Cir. 2005).
1os. This manipulation earned the consternation of the judge who authored the Padilla opinion.
See Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 587 (4 th Cir. 2005) (Luttig, J.) (denying the government's
motions for vacatur and transfer, which were presumably to prevent review by the Supreme
Court, and warning that "these impressions have been left, we fear, at what may ultimately
prove to be substantial cost to the government's credibility before the courts").
io6. This pattern cannot be described as a canon of statutory interpretation in the traditional
sense, as it does not reflect consistent construction of statutory text. Rather, it inserts a
temporal dimension into an AUMF, giving the same statute different meanings at different
times.
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courts cease to share the executive's crisis mentality. 7 In some cases the crisis
that precipitated the use of force will have ended, and the court may- in a time
of peace-side against the perceived excesses of war. While the turn against
permissive statutory interpretation may help restore the rule of law, overly
consistent decisions limiting executive authority may also unreasonably limit
the interpretation of similar language in the next AUMF. Nevertheless, this
pattern persists, and the harsh check on the executive issued in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld suggests a developing judicial trend against executive overreach in the
ongoing conflict with al Qaeda.1o 8
Cases that have determined the President's power under an AUMF rarely
speak in terms of the canons of statutory interpretation. Nevertheless, their
decisions fit closely into the same canon-based arguments used by both sides of
the NSA wiretap dispute. In Table 2, each case has been coded with at least one
canon, and some have been tagged with as many as three. The cases are neither
numerous nor consistent enough to provide definitive rules for the
interpretation of an AUMF. Relative tallies of generic canons and chronological
trends therefore serve only as a starting point to synthesize a composite
assessment of the context-based rules by which war powers statutes should be
interpreted. Part III will build on outcomes of cases broken down in Table 2 by
examining the underlying institutions that are delegating and implementing
war powers and, ultimately, by describing how these conflicts might be
resolved in the war powers context.
TABLE 1.
CANONS USED TO INTERPRET AUMFS
10 9
LAST IN TIME 1 2 3
SPECIFIC OVER GENERAL 4 4 8
107. See Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2358 (2006) (describing
the executive's self-perceived "duty to break eggs" and "duty to respond when eggs are
broken"); Michael J. Sniffen, Ex-Surveillance Judge Criticizes Warrantless Taps, WASH. POST,
June 24, 2007, at A7 ("The executive has to fight and win the war at all costs. But judges
understand the war has to be fought, but it can't be at all costs." (internal quotations marks
omitted) (quoting Judge Royce Lamberth)).
108. 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2753 (2006).
1o9. The dates in this Table refer to the AUMFs rather than the adjudications.
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IN PARI MATERIA 0 2 2
AGAINST IMPLICIT REPEALS 1 1 2
FULFILL PROVISOS 0 3 3
PROVISOS INTERPRETED NARROWLY 0 0 0
AVOID COMMANDER IN CHIEF 1 2 3
AVOID FOURTH AMENDMENT 1 0 1
AVOID FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKING 2 0 2
AVOID FIFTH AMENDMENT LIBERTY 0 2 2
AVOID SIXTH AMENDMENT 0 1 1
AVOID INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 0 5
III. THE CANONS OF WAR
This Part presents five canons for the interpretation of war powers
legislation. These canons aim to resolve conflicts between traditional canons in
a manner that does the least violence both to the statutes at issue and to the
Constitution. Each Section lays out one of five context-specific canons,
drawing initially from an empirical account of judicial precedents engaging
with challenges to the President's authority under an AUMF. I will supplement
this descriptive baseline with a prescriptive analysis of the desirability and
workability of each proposed canon. Finally, I will apply these context-specific
canons to the controversy over NSA wiretaps, where relevant. These synthetic,
context-specific canons provide a much-needed tool for both regularity and
principled decision making in this contentious field.
A. Canon I: An AUMF Does Not Supersede Specific Legal Frameworks Absent
Specific Legislative Instructions
The traditional canons most frequently applied to war powers statutes are
the rules that the "specific governs the general" and that the "last statute in
time governs.""' The conflict between an earlier specific statute and a later
110. See supra Table 1.
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general statute is obvious and inevitable. When faced with this conflict, in nine
of twelve cases the courts found that a specific framework statute trumps a
more recent AUMF. Although the Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi and the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Padilla both found that the post-September ii
AUMF implicitly overcame the specific mandate of the Non-Detention Act that
"[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States
except pursuant to an Act of Congress,""' the Hamdan Court's statement on
the issue is both more recent and deliberately definitive:
[W]hile we assume that the AUMF activated the President's war
powers and that those powers include the authority to convene military
commissions in appropriate circumstances, there is nothing in the text
or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting that Congress intended
to expand or alter the authorization set forth in Article 21 of the
UCMJ.
U2
The Court is willing to look, but if it does not find specific evidence, it will not
eliminate framework statutes based on a more recent AUMF. Thus the first
context-specific canon: an AUMF does not supersede specific legal frameworks
absent specific legislative instructions.
The impulse of Hamdi and Padilla-to supersede a precise statute in order
to maximize presidential authority-is not entirely without merit. AUMFs are
issued in times of crisis, when the country is about to engage in armed conflict
at the loss of blood and treasure. Congress's imperative is to authorize the
President to respond to the use or threatened use of force with the maximum
degree of flexibility." 3 Even at its most frantic, legislation is slow and
deliberative compared to executive action. By this logic, Congress should be
permitted simply to delegate the necessary authority to carry out its clear
objective of succeeding in whatever conflict requires the use of force, and
should not be forced to check a number of statutory boxes that grant specific
powers and eliminate past restrictions.
But Congress itself set up those boxes by earlier passing restrictive
framework statutes. While Congress generally cannot forbid its future
111. 18 U.S.C. S 4001(a) (2000); see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517-22 (2004); Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4 th Cir. 2005) (upholding the detention of a U.S. citizen without
referring to the Non-Detention Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)).
112. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775 (citations omitted). See generally Neil Kinkopf, The Statutoty
Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169, 1195-96 (2006) (concluding that joint legislative-
executive decision making should be preferred to a deferential nod to the executive).
113. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971) (describing the rapid action and
flexibility necessary to carry out armed conflict).
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incarnations from granting the executive broad authority or superseding past
legislation, 1 4 it can speed or slow their progress. By legislating specifically,
Congress can force future legislators to pass statutes specifically addressing the
issue, ' s or it may provide a clear avenue to authorize executive action."6 In the
case of FISA, Congress underwent extensive deliberation concerning the limits
of presidential power, even in times of war. "7 If it desired to allow the
executive to wiretap outside of FISA's strictures, it could have simply noted
that FISA does not apply to this specific conflict.1
8
Einer Elhauge has written that the best methods of statutory interpretation
will elicit Congress's true preference, even if the initial judicial decision is
contrary to both the enacting Congress's and the current Congress's respective
intents."19 So even if the first judicial decision does not comport with
congressional intent, it may yield a legislative correction, promoting both
clarity and deliberation. Thus, Elhauge's "preference eliciting statutory default
rules" promote not only interpretation in compliance with legislative intent,
but also the construction most susceptible to legislative override. 2°
Elhauge's first criterion- compliance with legislative intent- recognizes
that certain political environments are more conducive to thoughtful
lawmaking, meaning that statutes arising from particular legislative climates
are more likely to reflect a clear congressional intent. Therefore the statutory
output of such a period should be given greater credence when interpreting
conflicting statutes, thereby privileging deliberation over alacrity. For example,
the period after the Vietnam War may have reflected a historic level of distrust
114. See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872-74 (1996). But see Eric A. Posner
& Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665 (2002)
(asserting that there is no constitutional or normative bar to entrenchment).
11s. See, e.g., lo U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000) (requiring that procedures for military courts conform
to rules set by Congress in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, effectively requiring
specific congressional action to change such procedures).
116. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000) (providing a broad "Act of Congress" standard to
authorize military detention).
117. See, e.g., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act § 111, 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000) (authorizing
the President to circumvent FISA following a declaration of war, but only for fifteen
calendar days).
118. Cf Authorization of the Use of United States Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for
the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(b), 115 Stat.
224, 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I 2001)) (explicitly fulfilling the
requirements of the War Powers Resolution).
119. Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2168
(2002).
120. Id. at 2162, 2173-79.
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in the executive, but the framework statutes of the era reflect broad legislative
coalitions, sensitive to the concerns of the party occupying the White House
and careful to incorporate allowances for executive flexibility.2
During times of war, however, legislators clamoring for careful deliberation
are unlikely to prevail. When a foreign policy crisis mounts, the President
almost always gains both popular and congressional support, particularly if the
crisis is severe and well-reported and the President has room to improve in the
polls. 122 In particular, President Bush's approval ratings underwent a historic
spike following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 20Ol, rising from about
fifty percent between August 28 and 30 to about eighty percent between
September 14 and 16.123 Thus, a tendency for Congress to enact sweeping
authorizations that favor a popular President is understandable, if not
inevitable. While a canon favoring a broad AUMF because it is the last in time
might best capture the political climate of the moment, it forces action upon
Congress at times of severe institutional weakness, when the people look
uniquely to the executive for decisive leadership. Thus, a canon refusing to
supersede more specific enactments implicitly preserves Congress's war powers
without overt constitutional argument. Leaving the legislative framework in
place may ultimately force Congress to act again and with greater specificity.
The context-specific canon will have bought valuable time, however, for
passions to subside and debate to occur. When Congress truly wishes to grant
extensive executive powers, political support will make further authorization
an easy task.
Fulfilling Elhauge's second criterion, Congress should be able to overcome
judicial refusals to supersede specific legislation if it deems the ruling contrary
to its present intent, and the priority given to national security ensures that
legislative inertia is unlikely to prevent correction. The aftermath of Hamdan
demonstrates this perfectly. In the summer of 2006, the Supreme Court ruled
that the post-September 11 AUMF did not authorize the use of military
commissions, and that the restrictions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
121. See Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 144-48 (2d rev. ed. 2004) (describing the
coalition necessary to overcome President Nixon's veto of the War Powers Resolution as
well as congressional recognition of the President's authority to defend the nation without
authorization during "extraordinary and emergency circumstances").
122. William D. Baker & John R. Oneal, Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins
of the "Rally 'Round the Flag" Effect, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 661 (2ooi).
123. See PollingReport.com, President Bush: Job Ratings 1 (2007)
http://www.pollingreport.coni/Bushjobi.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007) (collecting data
from numerous polls). By late September 2003, President Bush's ratings had fallen back to
fifty percent. Id.
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(UCMJ) remained in place." Within four months of the decision, Congress
granted the President the power to establish military commissions under
regulations distinct from the UCMJ.'25 Of course, this legislative decision does
not prove the Supreme Court wrong. Rather, it demonstrates that the Hamdan
framework-judicial demand for specific legislation to supersede a framework
statute -is workable. However, if the Court had ruled in the President's favor
and Congress had wished to restrict his authority, then Congress would have
been hard-pressed to overcome a veto.2 6 Critically, when the executive loses,
the government nearly always receives a stay of the injunction,'27 allowing
Congress to establish its intent definitively before any damage to the war effort
occurs.
A difficult side effect of Elhauge's preference-eliciting statutory default
rules is that actions taken prior to legislative correction that conform with
congressional intent may still be ruled contrary to the law as it existed at the
time of the act. If courts construe AUMFs narrowly, consistent with Canon I,
then soldiers and policymakers might be exposed to criminal liability under the
specific limitations of the War Crimes Act, which criminalizes violations of the
Geneva Conventions." 8 This interpretive gap period could deter action at the
fringe of legality that has the potential to save lives. Fortunately, just as
Congress can intervene to reverse a judicial construction that limits presidential
power, it can retrospectively eliminate criminal liability in extreme cases for a
broad class of acts later determined to be necessary to save lives. 2 9 In the most
124. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2754 (2006).
125. See Military Commissions Act of 20o6, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 26oo (to be codified
at io U.S.C. 5§ 948a-950p); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 11-12 (D.D.C.
20o6) (applying a limitation on petitions for habeas corpus retroactively).
126. Cf Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230,
1255 (2007) (describing the ratchet effect caused by the confluence of deference to the
executive and the veto power).
127. See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 467 F.3d 590 (6th Cit. 2006)
(granting a stay of the district court's injunction against the NSA surveillance program).
Even if the government were to lose only in a final appeal, enforcement may still be stayed,
pending potential legislative modification.
128. See, e.g., Rosa Brooks, Op-Ed., The Geneva Convention 'Catch,' L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2006, at
B13; see also Adam Liptak, The Court Enters the War, Loudly, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, § 4, at
1 ("What the court is doing is attempting to suppress creative thinking .... " (quoting John
Yoo)).
129. See generally Comment, Today's Law and Yesterday's Crime: Retroactive Application of
Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 120 (1972) (describing the common law
doctrine of abatement, whereby the elimination of criminal liability may be applied
retroactively). But see Bruce Fein, The Pardon Pander: Congress Blatantly Oversteps Its Power
for the Sake of Two Border Patrol Agents, SLATE, July 26, 2007,
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extreme case, the President may of course pardon an individual who breaks the
law truly to save a life, further easing the pressure on statutory
interpretation.130 But correction only works in one direction; if courts were to
favor the more recent, broader authorization, legislative correction in the
criminal context would be barred by the constitutional ban on ex post facto
laws.
The first canon applies neatly to the NSA surveillance program. While the
post-September 11 AUMF is arguably more specific in terms of the particular
conflict, in the field of wiretapping, FISA is the more specific statute.
Moreover, the text and legislative history of the AUMF contain no references to
wiretapping."' Therefore, FISA still governs.
B. Canon II: AUMFs Empower the "Fundamental Incidents of Waging War"
but Do Not Otherwise Repeal Framework Statutes
Courts have at times interpreted AUMFs by applying traditional powers
triggered by an AUMF, effectively repealing a specific framework statute.
Courts shy away from discussion of explicit repeal, leaving only four cases that
use this drastic mode of interpretation. In the first two modern cases, both
dealing with the detention of American citizens under the post-September 11
AUMF, courts ruled for the executive. 32 While plainly not a large enough
batch to present a persuasive trend, the inner logic of these cases demonstrates
a willingness on the part of the judiciary to eliminate statutes that tread too
closely to traditionally recognized powers during a time of authorized conflict.
Thus, without explicitly relying on the Constitution in their statutory
arguments, courts empower the President to effectuate the powers of the
http://www.slate.con-/id/21712o9 (arguing that congressional action to bar enforcement of
generally applicable laws against particular individuals infringes on the President's unique
pardon power).
13o. As a practical matter, an individual pardon might not even be necessary. See Colin Freeze,
What Would Jack Bauer Do?, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 16, 2007, at A9 (quoting Justice
Scalia as proclaiming, "Jack Bauer saved Los Angeles.... He saved hundreds of thousands
of lives.... Is any jury going to convict Jack Bauer? I don't think so.").
131. See NSA III: Wartime Executive Powers and the FISA Court: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, lo9th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy), available at
http://fas.org/irp/congress/2oo6_hr/o328o6leahy.html ("The AUMF says nothing about
FISA or about domestic wiretaps. And no members of Congress I have spoken to
understood themselves to be partially repealing FISA's warrant requirement when they
voted for the AUMF.").
132. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (effectively repealing the Non-Detention Act of
1971, 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4 th Cit. 2005) (same).
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Commander in Chief based upon only an implicit congressional blessing.'3
Hamdan again presents a convincing counterpoint, specifically quoting Ex parte
Yerger for the notion that "[r]epeals by implication are not favored."'" An
appropriate context-specific canon must reconcile the case law's conflicting
principles.
Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith have argued persuasively that past
executive practice, paired with congressional acquiescence, helps determine the
breadth of presidential power under an AUMF."3s Given the higher likelihood
of congressional regulation in past conflicts, 36 conduct previously deemed
authorized by an AUMF alone should be considered similarly authorized by a
new authorization. This variation on the in pari materia canon infers from the
similar purpose of different AUMFs that Congress intended the later statute to
be interpreted in a manner similar to its historical antecedents. Nevertheless,
no AUMF before the post-September 11 AUMF had used the language seized
upon by many of the Bush Administration's supporters: "all necessary and
appropriate force."'137 For example, the World War II declaration of war with
Germany "authorized and directed [the President] to employ the entire naval
and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to
carry on war against the Government of Germany." 18 Similarly, some
authorizations have been conditionally granted 39 and some have severely
limited the situations in which force could be used.1 4° "Necessary and
133. See Padilla, 423 F.3d at 396 ("[T]he detention and trial of petitioners-ordered by the
President in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Army in time
of war and of grave public danger-are not to be set aside by the courts without the clear
conviction that they are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress
constitutionally enacted." (quoting Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942))).
134. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (quoting Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 8S,
105 (1868)).
135. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 83, at 2083-88.
136. See supra text accompanying note 94.
137. Authorization of the Use of U.S. Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for the Recent
Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. 5 1541 (Supp. I. 2001)).
138. Joint Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Government of Germany
and the Government and the People of the United States and Making Provision To
Prosecute the Same, Pub. L. No. 331, 55 Stat. 796 (1941).
139. See, e.g., Joint Resolution To Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces Pursuant to
United Nations Security Counsel Resolution 678, Pub. L. No. 102-1, 1O5 Stat. 3 (1991)
(requiring that the President certify that "the United States has used all appropriate
diplomatic and other peaceful means" prior to military force).
140. See, e.g., An Act More Effectually To Protect the Commerce and Coasts of the United States,
ch. 48, 1 Stat. 561 (1798); see also Cushing v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 1, 39-41 (1886) (noting
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
appropriate" leaves the executive with a heretofore unseen amount of
discretion, rhetorically akin to Congress's "necessary and proper" lawmaking
authority, making any power previously allowed solely by an AUMF within the
reasonable ambit of the current authorization.
1 41
At a minimum, despite the extensive field of framework statutes, an AUMF
must authorize some substantive authority that constitutes "force." With
permission to utilize the armed forces necessarily comes discretion in targeting,
the ability to recognize and reconnoiter the enemy, and the authority to capture
rather than kill an enemy subdued on the battlefield, as required by
international law.' 42 The Supreme Court's decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld laid
down the standard for a core power of the authorized Commander in Chief.
Actions that are "fundamental and accepted ... incident[s] to war"'143 are the
content of authorized "force," and these minimal activities must supersede
framework statutes in order to effectuate the AUMF. 44 Thus if the two statutes
are at loggerheads, the framework statute must yield to an implicit, if
temporary, repeal until the cessation of hostilities or the passage of another
statute. Without this context-specific trump over the canon against implied
repeals, judges are driven to undermine the logic of clear statement rules in
order to confer sufficient power to carry out a task jointly approved by both of
the political branches. 4s On the other hand, Hamdan's caution to limit implied
repeals should not be ignored, and if the powers demanded by the executive
extend beyond the core of war making, even a full declaration of war will not
repeal a framework statute. 1 6 These opposing principles in the case law yield a
that this AUMF did not include the authority to commit reprisals). Cushing and its
companion cases were not included in the dataset because the actions actually challenged
were French seizures that the American government had indemnified. See Convention
Between the French Republic and the United States of America, U.S.-Fr., Sept. 30, 18oo, 8
Stat. 178.
141. Limitations or authorizations in the explicit text of an AUMF do not fit into this historical
vein of interpretation, which is meant to give substance only to the vague notion of "force"
at the core of an AUMF.
142. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 30)(a), 13, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3518, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136.
143. 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004).
144. This is an argument of legal necessity, not a fiction of congressional knowledge or
acquiescence. Cf. Eskridge, supra note 41, at 1o8-13 (arguing that acquiescence cases are
more reasonably understood as relying on a presumption than on actual knowledge).
145. See, e.g., Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F. 3d 386, 396 (4 th Cir. 2005) ("Of course, even were a clear
statement by Congress required, the AUMF constitutes such a clear statement according to
the Supreme Court.").
146. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603, 615 (185o) ("[The President's] conquests do not ...
extend the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits before assigned to them
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context-specific canon: an AUMF empowers the "fundamental incidents of
waging war" but does not otherwise repeal framework statutes.
The question that remains is how to define "fundamental." The case law,
sparse as it may be, suggests a division between broad powers and the means
by which they may be executed. The President's power to try war criminals
provides a useful example. As Justice Thomas's Hamdan dissent made clear,
Hamdi recognized that "the 'capture, detention, and trial of unlawful
combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are 'important incident[s]
of war.' 1 47 But to grant a power is not to grant full authority over the means by
which it is to be executed. 48 The President may try enemy soldiers accused of
war crimes under the AUMF after Hamdan. But he must play by Congress's
rules: the Uniform Code of Military Justice, as supplemented by the Military
Commissions Act. 149
The NSA wiretapping program most likely exceeds the core power
authorized as "force." True, the DOJ whitepaper provides extensive historical
evidence that past Presidents carried out domestic reconnaissance under
AUMFs, providing a persuasive case that surveillance constitutes a
"fundamental and accepted incident to war," by acquiescence if not
affirmation. s0  Careful analysis of the historical support, however,
demonstrates that the breadth of the current program is beyond the powers
provided under prior AUMFs. Rather than merely reconnoitering targets or
intercepting communications between known combatants, or even between
combatants and their sympathizers, the current program merely requires a
reasonable basis to believe that "one party to the communication is a member
of al Qaeda, affiliated with al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated
with al Qaeda, or working in support of al Qaeda."'' Technological
advancements that make broad-based, computer-filtered surveillance possible
by the legislative power."). This distinction requires careful analysis of historical practice
and military necessity and will not silence all argument.
147. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2824 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004)).
148. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make Rules for
the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."); see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct.
at 2774 ("[T]he Quirin Court recognized that Congress had simply preserved what power
... the President had had before 1916 to convene military commissions-with the express
condition that the President and those under his command comply with the law of war.").
149. Uniform Code of Military Justice, lo U.S.C. §5 801-946 (2000); Military Commissions Act,
10 U.S.C. § 948a-950w (Supp. VI 20o6).
150. See DOJ Whitepaper, supra note 29, at 1386-9o.
151. Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen., Press Briefing on NSA Authorization (Dec. 19, 2005), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/neWs/2oo5/12/ag1219os.html.
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also facilitate the program's breadth and allow a quantity of targets
inconceivable to prior Congresses. Improvements in technology should help
further the purpose of an AUMF, but the executive cannot reasonably rely on
George Washington's practice of covertly opening British mail pouches to
assert that Congress undoubtedly authorized the monitoring of hundreds of
individuals suspected of affiliation with an individual suspected of affiliation
with the enemy." 2 Moreover, Cold War wiretapping- not even addressed by
the' DOJ whitepaper- cannot support the modern program. The widespread
wiretaps of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations were not
carried out pursuant to an AUMF, and that era's unchecked wiretapping has
been roundly criticized since it came to the attention of the other branches of
government." 3 Thus, the President may conduct reconnaissance under the
AUMF. But if he wishes to conduct electronic surveillance on Americans, he
must abide by Congress's regulations: the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act.
C. Canon III: An A UMF Should Be Read To Anticipate and Fulfill Provisos
It is a general canon of statutory interpretation that provisos are interpreted
narrowly in order to preserve the general purpose of the statute. Nevertheless,
in all four cases addressing whether an AUMF triggers a proviso, courts read
the AUMF to fit neatly into a gap in a previously enacted framework statute,
thereby suggesting a third context-specific canon: an AUMF should be read to
anticipate and fulfill provisos.
Why the context-specific reversal? Reservations to a general framework
statute serve two purposes: to restrict the triggering mechanisms to a statutory
exception and to alert future Congresses and interpreting judges of the enacting
Congress's awareness that exceptions may be necessary in future conflicts.
Many framework statutes are not meant to hamstring the President, but rather
to force consultation and cooperation with Congress.5 4 In order to receive
152-. Cf DOJ Whitepaper, supra note 29, at 1388 ("In fact, Washington himself proposed that one
of his Generals 'contrive a means of opening [British letters] without breaking the seals,
take copies of the contents, and then let them go on."' (quoting CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 31, 32 (1997))).
153. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972); SELECT COMMiTTEE To
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTMITIES:
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: BOOK II, S. REP. No. 94-755, at
14-15 (1976).
154. See, e.g., So U.S.C. § 1542 (2000) (requiring consultation with Congress before introducing
the U.S. armed forces into active or imminent hostilities).
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sufficient legislative support, reservations both allow and anticipate emergency
executive action.
And what type of crisis calls for an exception to a framework statute more
strongly than those requiring the use of military force? If a framework statute
bears an exception, the resultant question is what standard of legislative
expression should be required to activate it. Past practice indicates that once a
proviso has been enacted, a clear statement is not required; an AUMF will
implicitly satisfy broad conditions.' ss As described above, some AUMFs have
contained internal limitations, and the presence of a proviso reverses the
burden, requiring Congress to exclude the related power explicitly. Rather than
eliminating particular actions from the tools of war, statutes with broad
provisos can be understood as taking executive detentions and military
tribunals out of the sole discretion of the President and establishing a system
by which some minimal authorization is required prior to military measures.
This logic explains the trend seen in modern cases. The triggering
mechanism of the Non-Detention Act overcome in Hamdi required that "[n]o
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
pursuant to an Act of Congress. 1,6 While "Act of Congress" must include
federal criminal statutes, the context of the Non-Detention Act's passage
involved the repeal of a statute that granted the President the power to detain
U.S. citizens during executive-declared emergencies. sT Rather than eliminating
the possibility of the detention of U.S. citizens from the range of war powers,
Congress in the Non-Detention Act instead required a legislatively declared
emergency- necessitating the consensus of both political branches-before
detention of U.S. citizens could be authorized. Therefore the Hamdi plurality
simply acknowledged that the post-September ii AUMF is precisely the sort of
155. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (interpreting the post-September ii
AUMF to fulfill the proviso contained within the Non-Detention Act of 1971, 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a) (2000)); Wells v. United States, 257 F. 6o5 (9 th Cir. 1919) (interpreting the Joint
Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Government of Germany and
the Government and the People of the United States and Making Provision to Prosecute the
Same, Pub. L. No. 331, 55 Stat. 796 (1941), to fulfill the limitation that conspiracy may only
be charged against an individual who conspires to violate "a law," despite its failure to
conform with the procedures of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution).
156. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)
(2000)).
157. See id. (describing repeal of the Emergency Detention Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 811 (195o),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971)); see also So U.S.C. § 812 (195o)
(describing presidential declarations of an "internal security emergency" under the
Emergency Detention Act), repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347, 348 (1971).
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legislative authorization concerning "individuals in [a] narrow category"
envisioned by the drafters of the Non-Detention Act."8
Nevertheless, experience provides a strong argument against
overenthusiastic application of this permissive statutory default. Prior to the
passage of the post-September ii AUMF, congressional leaders took the time
to modify President Bush's proposed authorization to insert language fulfilling
the requirements of the War Powers Resolution.5 9 In anticipation of future
emergencies, Congress could maintain a list of similar provisions to trigger in
order to tailor the breadth of authorized force. Then provisos could be
explicitly triggered based on the inclusion of boilerplate language ready for use
in AUMFs. Congress does not legislate blindly, and aggressive use of a canon
favoring the anticipation and fulfillment of provisos supported by an
unwillingness to legislate explicitly allows vague statutes to overcome hard-
fought compromises, undermining valuable deliberation.
Turning again to the NSA wiretapping program, FISA recognizes that
declarations of war arrive in tumultuous times, and those times may require
wiretaps without the protection of the FISC. FISA anticipates this, however,
and allows "the President, through the Attorney General," to "authorize
electronic surveillance without a court order . . . for a period not to exceed
fifteen calendar days following a declaration of war by the Congress. ''16' This
broad proviso forms an archetypal application of the third canon. Formal
declarations of war are now anachronistic, and an AUMF should be read to
trigger the fifteen-day provision. Nevertheless, the limitation of the proviso to
a fifteen-day period makes clear that even the greatest emergencies should not
eviscerate FISA. While the proviso should be read broadly, no judicial decision
counsels that the triggered effects should be read liberally as well. According to
legislative history, this fifteen-day barrier aimed only to "allow time for
consideration of any amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a
wartime emergency. ',,6 Therefore, after fifteen days the proviso expires, and
absent any amendment, FISA returns to effect. Importantly, FISA procedures
were still utilized in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks,, 62 so
this proviso cannot be used to claim authorization even for the early days of the
158. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517.
159. RicHARD F. GuMMErr, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CONGRESSIONAL USE OF FUNDING CUTOFFS
SINCE 1970 INVOLVING U.S. MILITARY FORCES AND OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS 5-6 (2001),
available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS2o775.pdf.
160. 50 U.S.C. § 1811 (2000).
161. H.R. REP. No. 95-1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added).
162. See Sniffen, supra note 107 (describing applications for FISA warrants on September 11,
2oo, and in the days following).
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NSA surveillance program. The recently passed Protect America Act similarly
legalizes the NSA surveillance program,163 but only for a six-month period
while further legislation can be considered. 164
A superficial application of this canon suggests that the AUMF should be
read to anticipate and fulfill the FISA proviso that limits criminal liability
under that statutory framework to those individuals who "engage[] in
electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute.',,
6
,
But as David Kris deftly noted, this proviso eliminates only criminal liability for
surveillance.166 The provision concerning the authority to conduct surveillance
in the first place-the so-called exclusivity provision-contains no proviso at
all. 16 7 Accordingly, domestic electronic surveillance may only be conducted
pursuant to the procedures of FISA or Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, unless that specific provision is modified. FISA as
a whole therefore does not anticipate modification of its general rule by a broad
AUMF.
However, there is an additional difficulty. Because the exclusivity provision
lists the statutes capable of authorizing surveillance, new AUMFs that do not
specifically modify FISA do not fill the "surveillance authorized by statute"
proviso for criminal liability. The criminal liability proviso should therefore be
understood as shorthand for statutes listed in the exclusivity provision, rather
than an anticipation of additional authorization absent modification of the
exclusivity provision itself. The government tried to use this logic to reach the
opposite result, arguing that the AUMF first negates criminal liability and
therefore must also generally authorize surveillance. 168 This argument would
not only flout the central limitation of the framework statute, but it would also
allow a derivative purpose of FISA- criminal punishment of individuals who
conduct warrantless wiretaps - to trump the primary purpose of regulating the
circumstances under which the executive may engage in electronic
163. Protect America Act, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 2, 121 Stat. 552, 552-55 (2007).
164. Id. § 6(c), 121 Stat. at 557; see also Joby Warrick & Walter Pincus, How the Fight for Vast, New
Spying Powers Was Won, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 2007, at Ai (describing House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi's declaration that work on a permanent fix would begin promptly).
165. 50 U.S.C. § 18o9(a)(1) (2000).
166. See Kris Memorandum, supra note 44, at 4.
167. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2000); see also Kris Memorandum, supra note 44, at 2.
168. DOJ Whitepaper, supra note 29, at 1393-1401; see also Kris Memorandum, supra note 44, at 4
(dubbing this the government's "transitive argument").
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surveillance. 6 9 At most, the "authorized by statute" proviso protects
government officers from criminal sanction while the tap remains ultra vires.
The upshot is that an assessment of FISA as a whole renders the scope of the
"surveillance authorized by statute" proviso unambiguous, and so makes
application of the canon to FISA unnecessary to interpret that provision.
D. Canon IV: An A UMF Should Be Interpreted Both To Avoid Infringing on
the President's Authority To Dictate the Tactical Essence of War and To
Distinguish Between Actions Against Protected and Nonprotected Classes
Use of government powers during armed conflict inevitably butts against
core civil liberties. But in times of war, the Constitution deliberately provides
the government's greatest powers, ranging from the command of military
forces to the ability to suspend habeas corpus, 17' and an AUMF activates this
central well of authority.1 7' Given the vague nature of most AUMFs, they are
susceptible to saving constructions, allowing constitutional avoidance to
shoulder the work explicit constitutional adjudication would do in other
scenarios. In many cases, constitutional avoidance should be lauded as a
remedy to plain unconstitutionality; this conclusion does not require separate
analysis. The more difficult case is what Adrian Vermeule has termed modern
avoidance: when a court merely avoids constitutional difficulty or doubt.
1 7 2
Courts have interpreted AUMFs both to avoid interfering with the
Commander-in-Chief Clause and to avoid infringing on the Bill of Rights. In
three cases, courts have ruled that an AUMF must be interpreted in order to
avoid infringing on the President's power, while in five cases other
constitutional values have explicitly shaped statutory interpretation. 173 The
question is what principled distinction divides these cases.
The three cases relating to the President's power as Commander in Chief
all defer to the executive on the question of defining the scope of the conflict
and the identity of the enemy.' 74 For example, Orlando v. Laird counsels that
169. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, 1783
(labeling the bill "An Act To Authorize Electronic Surveillance To Obtain Foreign
Intelligence Information").
170. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; id. art. II, § 2.
171. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006) (describing the post-September ii
AUMF as having "activated the President's war powers").
172. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEo. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997).
173. See supra Table 1.
174. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d
Cit. 1971); The Alexander, i F. Cas. 357 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 169).
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once Congress has authorized armed conflict, the judiciary should not interfere
with the "highly complex considerations of diplomacy, foreign policy and
military strategy" effectively carried out by the executive.1 7' Thus, avoidance of
infringing on the Commander in Chief power leaves the President to dictate
the "tactical essence of war.'
' 76
On the other hand, avoidance of infringing on civil liberties prominently
divides protected and unprotected classes in an armed conflict. The laws of war
privilege lawful combatants above unlawful combatants and privilege
nonbelligerents above all.177 Moreover, the placement of detainees into
particular judicial processes will imbue them with constitutional rights not
possessed by detainees merely held to prevent a return to the battlefield. 178 The
Fourth Circuit's split between Padilla v. Han ft 
79 and Al-Marri v. Wrights °
provides the glaring example. In Padilla, the individual declared an enemy
combatant had allegedly carried firearms on the battlefield against the United
States. The Fourth Circuit placed Padilla squarely under the mantle of illegal
enemy combatant, despite his American citizenship, and ruled that he could be
held for the duration of hostilities under the post-September 11 AUMF ., 8 By
comparison, in Al-Marri, the Fourth Circuit found that an individual who had
not borne arms on a battlefield remained a nonbelligerent. Despite being a
Qatari national, al-Marri's privileged status brought into consideration a Fifth
175. 443 F.2d at 1043 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85-86
(construing the Joint Resolution Declaring that a State of War Exists Between the Imperial
Government of Japan and the Government and the People of the United States and Making
Provisions To Prosecute the Same, Pub. L. No. 328, 55 Star. 795 (1941), to conform with the
President's power as Commander in Chief to declare certain areas within the United States
to be military areas from which Japanese-Americans might be excluded).
176. Noah Feldman & Samuel Issacharoff, Declarative Sentences, SLATE, Mar. 5, 2007,
http://wvw.slate.con/id/2161172.
177. See AM. BAR ASS'N TASK FORCE ON ENEMY COMBATANTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 3-7 (2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aba/
abatskforce1o3rpt.pdf; see also William Glaberson, Military Judges Dismiss Charges for 2
Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at Al (describing ruling by military judges at
Guantanamo Bay that their jurisdiction extends only to illegal enemy combatants).
178. See United States v. Moussaoui, 365 F. 3d 292, 312 (4th Cit. 2004) (holding, in light of a
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, that the AUMF does not provide authority to
withhold access to enemy combatant witnesses); see also id. at 321 (Williams, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (describing the post-September 11 AUMF's grant of
"executive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by litigation" (quoting
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 774 (1950))).
179. 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).
180. 487 F.3 d 16o (4th Cir. 2007).
181. 423 F.3d at 392.
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Amendment right against arbitrary detention acquired through residence in the
United States. Thus the Fourth Circuit held that the AUMF did not imbue the
executive with the authority to detain al-Marri without criminal charges.182
A context-specific canon can narrow the scope of potential conflicts, even if
it does not eliminate all overlap: an AUMF should be interpreted both to avoid
infringing on the President's authority to dictate the tactical essence of war and
to distinguish between actions against protected and nonprotected classes. In
other words, when Congress has authorized the President to achieve a
particular objective by the use of force, courts should presume that Congress
intended to provide flexibility concerning the choices of a military commander,
including determining the identity of the enemy and distributing forces. But
once enemies have been targeted, the scope of authorized military action
against them is cabined by membership in a constitutionally protected class,
such as citizens, permanent residents, or persons with "sufficient connection"
with the United States to be considered a part of the "national community." ' 83
Notably, no past case grants Chevron-type deference to the executive when
interpreting vague authorizations. Such deference-which would effectively
implement Justice Thomas's lone dissent in Hamdi 84-would provide perverse
incentives for Congress to limit executive flexibility in wartime. If courts were
to defer to interpretations that would inevitably maximize executive authority,
Congress could retain control over war powers only by legislating with
cumbersome specificity; any other approach might effectively authorize
unbridled executive power as presidential rulemaking outstrips Congress's
ability to shape the conduct of war.' Moreover, as described above, legislative
corrections aimed to curtail executive power must overcome a presidential veto,
making them nearly impossible in the context of a military crisis.' 86 The result
would be a tremendous rise in interbranch conflicts and a substantial reduction
in the role of Congress in the political branches' joint military venture.
182. 487 F. 3 d at 177-78.
183. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
184. But see Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARv. L. REv. 2663, 2672
(2005) (arguing for Chevron deference to executive interpretation concerning war powers);
see also Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1170, 1197 (2007) (asserting that AUMFs "fall comfortably within the basic framework of
Chevron").
185. See Koh, supra note 78, at 1292 (noting that the President's "decisionmaking processes can
take on degrees of speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no other governmental
institution can match").
186. See supra Section III.A.
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Again, we apply these principles to the NSA surveillance program. As in
many other cases, constitutional avoidance cuts in both directions. However,
the avoidance canon's usefulness is not in assessing the general conflict, as
avoidance of one constitutional question will merely magnify the other. For
example, if an individual raised an equal protection challenge based on the use
of donations to banned Muslim charities as a criterion, then the Commander-
in-Chief Clause might be invoked to delegate such decision-making authority
to the President, despite statutory limitations., 8' Neither side should claim that
constitutional avoidance is sufficient to resolve the conflict over the warrantless
wiretap program as a whole. Instead, constitutional avoidance provides a
powerful tool when assessing challenges to particular wiretaps, which will raise
constitutional questions more or less strongly. Thus courts should distinguish
between, for example, wiretap claims raised by American callers and those
raised by foreign recipients.
E. Canon V: An AUMF Is Limited by International Law Integrated into
Framework Statutes
Interpretation to avoid violations of international law provides a unique but
related issue. Five cases have interpreted nineteenth-century AUMFs to avoid
conflicts with international law. 8 8 Yet as domestic perception of international
law has evolved from being "part of our law"' to a patchwork of ambitious
declarations 9 ° and treaties riddled with reservations,1 9' courts ceased to
constrain the breadth of AUMFs by reference to international law. 92 To the
extent that it once governed the interpretation of AUMFs, avoidance of
international law - independent of domestic implementation - has not affected
interpretation of an AUMF in a hundred years. As one recent commentator
187. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20oobb to 20oobb- 4 (2000).
188. Macleod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416 (1913); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (19oo);
Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 458 (1805); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy,
6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 18o6).
189. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
19o. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. DocA/81o (Dec. 12, 1948).
191. See Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1
CHI. J. INT'L L. 347, 347-48 (2000).
192. See AI-Marri v. Wright, 487 F.3d 16o, 178 (4 th Cir. 2007) ("[W]e note that American courts
have often been reluctant to follow international law in resolving domestic disputes."). See
generally Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the
Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REv. 293 (2005) (describing the Hamdi Court's failure to
take international law into account sufficiently).
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
stated, the debate over the applicability of international law to essential
exercises of government power "has been almost entirely eclipsed by events on
the ground." '93
Justice Stevens's application of the Geneva Conventions in Hamdan
demonstrates the modern compromise between international legalism and
advocates of sovereignty. Rather than ruling on the strength of the Geneva
Conventions alone, the Stevens majority found that the Uniform Code of
Military Justice "conditions the President's use of military commissions on
compliance not only with the American common law of war, but also with...
the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949."' 94 The Fourth Circuit adopted
this same technique in Al-Marri but went one step further. Rather than
holding that a framework statute had integrated the standards of international
law, the court ruled that the AUMF itself integrated the standards of the laws
of war.'95 This can be seen as a particularly far-reaching application of the
general Hamdan principle and of the final canon of war: an AUMF is limited by
international law integrated into framework statutes.
This canon demonstrates that international law still plays a role in war
powers law, albeit perhaps a more limited one than was envisioned by those
who wrote that "[t]reaties ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."' 6 Where
Congress has expressly codified treaty requirements, it provides an effective
signal to other nations of the rules to which the United States has fully
committed. 97 Moreover, Congress has been willing to pass domestic
legislation implementing treaties when the international commitments
conform to strong domestic norms.198 Although not at issue in recent cases, the
193. Laura Moranchek Hussain, Note, Protecting and Enforcing the Treaty Rights ofAliens, 117 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming 2007).
194. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786 (2006); see also id. at 2802 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (using the same means to integrate the Uniform Code of Military Justice into
domestic law).
19s. AI-Marri, 487 F.3d at 184-86. By requiring that any AUMF integrate the laws of war by
implication, the decision performs an end-run around the problem of self-execution that the
Supreme Court narrowly avoided in Hamdan.
196. U.S. CONST. art. X7, cl. 2.
197. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary International
Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 12o HARv. L. REV. 869, 931-32 (2007) (suggesting
that the unwritten norms of customary international law must be explicitly codified to take
effect in all contexts).
198. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-234°A (2000) (providing for limited implementation of the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (Dec. io, 1984)).
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same logic of effective signaling and concrete legislative commitment could
apply to the rare incident where the Senate ratifies a treaty that is explicitly
self-executing on its face without a reservation-in other words, a treaty that
creates binding obligations without supplemental legislation.
In practice, this regime adds an extra step to the avoidance regime laid out
in Charming Betsy.199 Justice Marshall famously instructed that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains."2 ' Thus, a court must first determine the
substance of international law, then determine if international and domestic
law appear to be in conflict. If such a conflict might exist under one of several
possible interpretations, the court must interpret the domestic statute to avoid
a conflict. Under the Hamdan rule, the Court has inserted an additional step.
Once a conflict has been discovered, first an avoidance analysis is applied to
international law. If the international law provision is not clearly enforceable-
either through integration in a statute or express self-execution- then
international law yields. However, if international law is domestically
implemented or clearly self-executing, then the AUMF should not overrule it,
an analysis similar to Canon I above. This would allow for additional flexibility
when the core interests of the sovereign are at stake, while still maintaining the
vital protections of international law. Moreover, although limitations on
international law are most widely advocated by proponents of executive
flexibility,20' this modern implementation provides a further bulwark to
Congress's enumerated powers. Domestic legislation, unlike treaty making,
gives a role to both houses of Congress and places Congress, rather than the
executive, in the role of principal drafter.
IV. THE CANONS APPLIED
The canons can be applied to concrete cases beyond the NSA surveillance
program. Applying the context-specific canons to a series of graduated
scenarios best demonstrates their efficacy; the application results in conclusive
statutory construction. Just as importantly, these context-specific canons
ensure that the norms underpinning war powers legislation are not lost in the
process of interpretation.
Consider three examples.
199. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
200. Id. at 118.
2o. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 79, at 182-214 (advocating a limited role for international law in
restraining the executive branch).
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The NSA taps a radical American imam's phone within ten days of the
passage of the post-September 1ith AUMF, without attempting to obtain a
warrant. The imam's conversations with non-Americans in Algeria reference a
plot to attack Washington within seventy-two hours. The President sends FBI
agents to the imam's home where they engage in heated but not physically
coercive interrogation.
The NSA taps an American businessman's phone five weeks after the
passage of the post-September ii AUMF, without attempting to obtain a
warrant. The NSA records the businessman's conversations with non-
Americans in North Korea, nuclear scientists who might one day sell
technology to al Qaeda. As a preventative measure, the President freezes cash
transfers to the scientists.
The NSA taps an American attorney's phone six years after the passage of
the post-September ii AUMF, without attempting to obtain a warrant. The
NSA records the attorney's conversations with a non-American client recently
released from Guantanamo Bay after being given "No Longer Enemy
Combatant" status. The client-now living outside the United States and
unwilling to assist the government that detained him-is believed to have
useful information but remains cleared of any affiliation with or material
support for al Qaeda. FBI officials seize the attorney's son and mock-execute
him in front of the attorney in an attempt to learn the client's whereabouts.
At a visceral level, one would expect scenario one to be legal and scenario
three to be illegal. This is largely how the canons play out. In scenario one, the
warrentless wiretap does not fall directly into FISA's exception for wiretaps for
fifteen days following a declaration of war. Nevertheless, Canon III instructs
that provisos to framework statutes should be interpreted under a relaxed
standard, and an AUMF-the modern variant of a declaration of war-can
anticipate and fulfill the proviso. Similarly, under Canon V violations of the
Geneva Conventions are impermissible, as the War Crimes Act provides an
express implementation of international law,2"2 and the Geneva Conventions
bar even excessive threats as a form of cruel, inhuman, or degrading
20treatment.03 Mere heated threats, however, are unlikely to exceed this
protective standard, and no reasonable prosecutor would bring charges in this
scenario. Moreover, if agents were convicted for conduct deemed necessary or
202. 18 U.S.C. 5 24,41 (2000).
203. Id. § 2441(c)(1) (2000); see also Human Rights Educ. Ass'n, Torture, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment, http://www.hrea.org/earn/guides/torture.html (2003) ("[T]orture is not
limited to acts causing physical pain or injury. It includes acts that cause mental suffering,
such as through threats against family or loved ones.").
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even laudatory, Congress could retroactively alleviate criminal liability for
"verbal threats" while appeals were pending.
On the other hand, the third scenario contains three pointed legal mishaps.
First, the wiretap violates EISA, as described by the first three canons
elaborated above.2 °4 Canon I instructs that the later AUMF does not supersede
the more specific Act. As broad domestic surveillance does not fall within the
fundamental incidents of waging war, Canon II shows that the AUMF did not
repeal FISA. Additionally, while Canon III eases the friction in fitting an
AUMF with a proviso in a framework statute, the canon does not counsel the
elimination of express limitations to the proviso itself. Since the "authorized by
statute" proviso only applies to FISA's criminal enforcement provision, the
AUMF cannot be read to authorize taps in light of the exclusivity provision,
which itself has no proviso.
Second, the subject of the wiretap falls outside of a reasonable
interpretation of the AUMF's delegation to the President to use force against
"those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September ii,
2001. " "2s While the language directs the President to make the determination
regarding the connection to the attack, it also provides an enumerated list of
targets, which the President has plainly exceeded. Therefore, even in the core
military function of determining targets, the extent of the authorization draws
a firm border; under Canon IV the President's Commander-in-Chief authority
does not trump this clear statement26
Third, as laid out in the argument related to Canon V above, the War
Crimes Act bars torture such as mock-execution, and Canon I indicates that the
bar persists even under a broad AUMF.
In the middle lies the most difficult scenario. While a court might be less
likely to contest executive action taken so early in a conflict, Canons I, II, and
III all demonstrate that the wiretap is illegal once outside the safe-harbor of
FISA's fifteen-day proviso, as described in reference to the third scenario. A
court might withhold liability under a liberal reading of the proviso to FISA's
criminal provision, as dictated by Canon III, but the tap itself would
undoubtedly be ultra vires. The targeting of an individual who might assist al
204. For more extensive discussion, see supra Sections III.A-C.
205. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Star. 224 (2001) (codified at 5o U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. 1 2001)).
2o6. While this limitation runs against the core functions that Canon II protects, it is still a valid
one. Congress's initial authorization cannot repeal itself, so this original determination of
the scope of the authorized conflict remains in force. To demand otherwise would place an
unreasonable degree of discretion in the hands of the President and would disincentivize
authorization, as Congress would be forced into an all-or-nothing choice.
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Qa eda in the future also provides a difficult question. While the AUMF
delegates the targeting decision to the President, a delegation that dovetails
with the authority of the Commander in Chief, even individuals connected
with a rogue state do not fall within the plain limitations of the statute. The
AUMF is drafted in the past tense-referring to those who "planned,
authorized, committed, or aided" the September ii attack.0 7 On the other
hand, if the President believed at the time that the North Koreans had provided
any form of support to al Qaeda, the court would undoubtedly defer to him,
interpreting the AUMF to allow maximum flexibility and avoid conflict with
the Commander-in-Chief Clause.
Even if a court were to find that the wiretap was impermissible or the
AUMF did not apply to the scientists, however, the President would still have
the power to halt asset transfers preventatively in light of concerns over the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, the President has the authority to regulate
payments to a foreign national in response to a presidentially declared
emergency."' A state of emergency has persisted with regard to proliferation
since 1994, with the ongoing consent of Congress, giving the President
precisely the authority exercised here. 9 Canon IV is the only rule with any
potential applicability. While the American transferor's property has been
seized, raising Fifth Amendment concerns, his interest is limited posttransfer,
and a challenge to the IEEPA framework would undoubtedly fail. In this case,
Congress and the President have worked in harmony to provide powers
deemed necessary to the national defense, and the courts should not undo their
clear, joint action.
CONCLUSION
The Youngstown framework calls for judges to decide if a statutory scheme
places Congress's authority in support of or in opposition to the President's
207. To Authorize the Use of U.S. Armed Forces Against Those Responsible for the Recent
Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Star. 224, 224
(2001) (codified at 5o U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. 1 2001)).
208. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2000).
209. See Exec. Order No. 13,382, 3 C.F.R. 170 (2005) (specifically authorizing action against
persons who "pose a risk of materially contributing to[] the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction"); Exec. Order No. 12,938, 59 Fed. Reg. 59,099 (Nov. 14, 1994) (declaring
emergency concerning proliferation). Congress must review any ongoing national
emergency every six months and may terminate any national emergency by joint resolution.
50 U.S.C. § 1622(a)(1), (b) (2000).
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executive powers; the answer inevitably depends on statutory interpretation.
AUMFs are at their core statutes, and their meaning-when interpreted in
conjunction with framework statutes -constitutes the difference between
Youngstown's first and third categories. In the first category, the President
nearly always wins. In the third, the President nearly always loses. The
interpretation of AUMFs and the framework of war powers statutes is thus the
linchpin of the key legal question of our day: what is the extent of the
President's power in the war on terror?
When these important statutes clash, the traditional canons of statutory
interpretation have proven insufficient to resolve the conflict. Context-specific
canons provide principled resolution to these otherwise intractable or
dissatisfying debates, determining which statutes govern in particular types of
statutory collisions. Established rules that yield consistent results will allow the
executive to act within the bounds of law, Congress to delegate without fear of
subordination, and the constitutional, structural, and historical considerations
that underlie war powers statutes to be fully effectuated.
The need for executive flexibility, in order to achieve the goals set forth by
Congress at a minimal loss of blood and treasure, is undoubtedly great, yet so
is the threat that the essential rights that make our nation worth fighting for
will be lost in the fray. If the United States has entered an intractable conflict
with an enemy defined by little more than unflinching ideology, it must
understand the scope of the authorization governing that war. With unique
statutes governing armed conflict, the courts need unique interpretive
guidelines: the canons of war.
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TABLE 2.
CASES ADDRESSING PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY UNDER 
AN AUMF
210
HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD, 126 s. CT. 2749 (2006). 5, 6
HAMDI V. RUMSFELD, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 1, 2, 3
EX PARTE ENDO, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 10
HIRABAYASHI V. UNITED STATES, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 4
MACLEOD V. UNITED STATES, 229 U.S. 416 (1913). 5, 12
THE PAQUETE HABANA, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). 12
FLEMING V. PAGE, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850). 6
BROWN V. UNITED STATES, 12 U.S. (8 CRANCH) 110 (1814). 5, 10
MALEY V. SHATTUCK, 7 U.S. (3 CRANCH) 458 (1806). 8,10, 12
MURRAY V. THE SCHOONER CHARMING BETSY, 6 U.S. (2 CRANCH) 64 12
(1804).
AL-MARRI V. WRIGHT, 487 F.3D 160 (4TH CIR. 2007). 5,9
PADILLAV. HANFT, 423 F.3D 386 (4TH CIR. 2005). 1,2,3
UNITED STATES V. MOUSSAOUI, 365 F.3D 292 (4TH CIR. 2004). 5,11
ORLANDO V. LAIRD, 443 F.2D 1039 (2D CIR. 1971). 4
WELLS V. UNITED STATES, 257 F. 605 (9TH CIR. 1919). 3
THE JOSEPH, 13 F. CAS. 1126 (C.C.D. MASS. 1813) (NO. 7533). 5
21o. Key to canons: (1) last in time, (2) in pari natetia, (3) anticipate provisos, (4) constitutional
avoidance (commander in chief power), (5) specific governs the general, (6) against implicit
repeals, (7) provisos construed narrowly, (8) constitutional avoidance (Fourth
Amendment), (9) constitutional avoidance (Fifth Amendment: liberty), (io) constitutional
avoidance (Fifth Amendment: takings), (ii) constitutional avoidance (Sixth Amendment),
and (12) avoid conflicts with international law.
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THE ALEXANDER, 1 F. CAS. 357 (C.C.D. MASS. 1813) (NO. 169). 4
UNITED STATES V. SMITH, 27 F. CAS. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (NO. 16,342). 5, 12
AL-ODAH V. UNITED STATES, 346 F. SUPP. 2D 1 (D.D.C. 2004). 5
KENNEDY V. RICKER, 14 F. CAS. 318 (D.C.D.N.H. 1801) (NO. 7705). 1
IMI
